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[Crim. No. 9272. In Bank. Dec. 6,1965.]

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v.· JOSEPH H.
THAYER et at, Defendants and Appellants.

CJ

(1] Searches and Seizures-Search Warrants-Seizure of Endelltial7 Matter.-There is no special sanctity in papers, as distinguished from other forms of property, to render them
immune from search and seizure where they fall within the
scope of principles as to what property may be seized; private
papers that are instruments of crime may be seized.
[2] Icl.-8earch Warrants-Seizure of Evidentiary Matter.-The
rule that mere evidence of crime, as opposed to contraband or
instruments or fruits of crime, cannot be seized under a warrant or otherwise is rejected by statute. (Pen. Code, § 1524,
subd.4.)
IS] Oourts-Decisions-Relatiollship of Oourts-Federal and State.
-Federal rules based on the supervisory power of the U.S.
Supreme Court over the administration of justice in the federal
courts are not binding on the states.
[4] Searches and Seizures-8earch Warrants-Seizure of Evidential7 JIrIatter.-The rule that mere evidence of crime, as opposed to contraband or instruments or fruits of crime, cannot
be seized under a warrant or otherwise is not a constitutional
standard and has no application in California.
[6] Id.-8earch Warrant&-Seizure of Evidelltiary Matter.-":'Even
if the mere evidence rule were a constitutional standard, it
would not require the exclusion of a doctor's medical care
records seized pursuant to warrant in a prosecution for submitting false claims to a bureau of public assistance for treatment of patients whose medical care was paid by the bureau
where the records were instruments of crime, the doctor's
employees testifying to use of the records to draft the fraudulent claims.
[6] Id.-8earch Warraats-8eizuioe of Evldelltiary Matter.-Even
if there were a rule protecting privacy by preserving private
papers from any seizure it would not prevent the seizure of
business files, such as the medical records of a doctor accused
of submitting fraudulent claims to a bureau of public assistance
for treatment of patients whose medical care was paid by the
bureau where the medical records were freely open to the
doctor's employees.
[1] See Oal.Jur.2d, Searches and Seizures, 112; Am.Jur.,
Searches and Seizures (1st ed § 14).
Melt. Dig. References: [1, 2,4, 6] Searches and Seizures, §§ 11,
86; [3] Courts, §l06; [5] Searches and Seizures, § II
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APPEALS from judgments of the Superior Court of Los:.
Angeles County and from orders denying new trials. Herbert·~
V. Walker, Judge. Judgments aflirmed; appeals from orders.~

SUbmi~;l"

i
: : :tion for submitting and for conspiring to
fraudulent claims for payment for medieal services allegedly·'
rendered to welfare patients. Judgments of conviction af:firmed'l
d

Ball, Hunt" Hart, Joseph A. Ball and Harman 14. Bitt:
for Defendants and Appellants.
1
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, William E. James,j
Assistant Attorney General, and Jack K. Weber, Deputy i
Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
TRAYNOR, C. J.-Defendants Thayer and Magruder were
convicted of 22 counts of violating section 72 of the Penal
Code by submitting false and fraudulent claims to the Bureau
of Public Assistance of Los Angeles County and of conspiring
to submit such claims. They appeal from the judgments on
the sole ground that records used as evidence against them
were unconstitutionally obtained.
Defendant Thayer is a physician; defendant Magruder is
his office assistant. Dr. Thayer treated patients whose medical
care was paid for by the Bureau of Public Assistance. For
each patient he submitted a "medical care statement" to the
bureau and certi1led thereon that he had performed the services described, that the amount was due and unpaid, and that
the stated fee represented the entire charge for services to
the patient.
At the trial, the prosecution sought to prove that the bureau
was billed for services never performed and for services also
billed to others. It introduced into evidence medical care
statements submitted to the bureau and corresponding medical
care records taken from Dr. Thayer's :files under a search
warrant. Charges for visits and treatments on the statements
were not shown in Dr. Thayer's records. In addition, many
of the records contained illegible scrawls or wavy lines correspondihg to items billed on the statements. Several of pr..
Thayer's employees testified that they used these records in
preparing the statementsl and that they were instructed to
show at least four visits on each statement whether or not
•.there had been that many visits. There was also testimony
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that the wavy lines were written by D:t. Thayer to indicate
. visits or treatments that were to be billed to the bureau even
though they had never occurred.
Defendants contend that the seizure of the records and their
use as evidence constituted an unreasonable search and seizure
and a violation of their privilege against self.incrimination
under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution and corresponding provisions of
the California Constitution. They urge that the records could
not be _seized even under a warrant concededly authorized
by statute (Pen. Code, § 1524), because they were merely
evidence of crime and not contraband, instruments of crime,
or fruits of crime.
The asserted rule that mere evidence cannot be seized under
a warrant or otherwise is condemned as unsound by virtually
all the modern writers. It is typically described as "unfortunate" (8 Wigmore, Evidence (McNaughton rev. 1961)
§ 2184(a), pp. 45-46) and is a commonly-used example of a
legal absurdity. (See, e.g., Kamisar, Public Safety v. Individual Liberties: Some "Faots" end "Theones" (1962) 53
J.Crim.L., C.&P.S. 171, 177; Kaplan, Be arch and Seizure: A
No-Man's Land in tlte CriminaZ Law (1961) 49 Cal.L.Rev.
474, 477-479; Comment, Limitations on Seizure of I I Evidentiary" Objects: A RuZe in Bearch of e Reason (1953) 20
U.Chi.L.Rev. 819; Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio At Large in the
Fifty States, 1962 Duke L.J. 819, 380-831.) Although often
invoked in cases involving the seizure of papers, the rule is
not limited to papers at all but purports to prohibit the
seizure of any object that is merely evidentiary. The rationale
for this curious doctrine has never been satisfactorily articu.
lated. It creates a totally arbitrary impediment to law enforcement without protecting any important interest of the
defendant. A person has a constitutional right to be secure
from unreasonable searches and seizures by the police. When
the search itself is reasonable, however, it is impossible to
understand why the admissibility of seized items should
depeDll on whether they are merely evidentiary or evidentiary
plus something else. The rule seems to have its basis in property concepts,.in a theory that the sovereign may seize only
those objects that it is ilJegal to possess, or to which the
sovereign may assert a claim bl!C&use they have been wrongfully obtained or used. (GouZed v. United Btates (1921) 255
U.S. 298, 309 [41 S.Ct. 261, 65 L.Ed. 647].) The modern
view, however, is that the exclusionary rules of evidence exist
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primarily to protect personal rights rather than property
interests and that common-law property concepts are usually
irrelevant. (.Tones v. United States (1960) 362 U.S. 257, 266
[80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697, 78 A.L.R.2d 233].) Determining
the admissibility of evidence on the basis of the sovereign'.
right at common law to replevy the items is anachronistic.
It inevitably gives rise to technical rules that are entirely
unrelated to the real issues of individual privacy and law
enforcement that are involved.
Although property notions fathered the rule, some of the
opinions imply that its major purpose is to prevent explora- :
tory searches. (See, e.g., United States v. Lefkowitz (1932)
285 U.S. 452, 465-466 [52 S.Ct. 420, 76 L.Ed. 877, 82 A.L.R.
·775].) If that is the purpose of the rule, it is certainly not
its effect. The rule does not prevent exploratory searches at
all; it prevents the seizure of mere evidence in the course
of any search, reasonable or unreasonable, specific or general.
It has also been suggested that the rule protects privacy by
preserving a man's most private papers from any scrutiny
or seizure, however reasonable. (Comment (1953) 20 U.Chi. 1
L.Rev. 319, 327.) The difficulty with this rationale is that 1
the rule protects, not private papers, but mere evidence.
[1] "There is no special sanctity in papers, as distinguished !
from other forms of property, to render them immune from
search and seizure, if only they fall within the scope of the
principles of the cases in which other property may be seized. "
(Gouled v. United States (1921) 255 U.S. 298, 809 [41 S.Ot.
261,65 L.Ed. 647].) Private papers that are the instruments
of crime, such as a spy's code books (AbeZ v. United States
(1960) 362 U.S. 217 [82 S.Ct. 683,4 L.Ed.2d 668]) may be
seized. Finally, it is impossible to sustain the mere evidence
rule as a corollary of the privilege against self-incrimination. : .
It is not limited to self-incriminating writings, and when such
writings are obtained by seizure, instead of by subpoena, the
defendant does not impliedly admit their genuineness. (See
Maguire, Evidence of Guilt (1959) p. 23; Meltzer, Bequired
Becord3, tke McCarren Act, and tke Privilege Against Sel/Incrimination (1951) 18 U.Chi.L.Rev. 687,700; cf. Boyd v.
United States '(1886) 116 U.S. 616 [6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed.
746].) Moreover, the papers are no less self-incriminating
when they can be classified as contraband, instruments of
crime, or fruits of crime.
[2] In California, the mere evidence rule is rejected by
statute. (Pen. Code, § 1524, subd. 4.) Defendants contend,
'however, that Mapp v. Okio (1961) 867 U.S. 643 [81 S.Ot.
,
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1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081, 84 A.L.R.2d 933], Ker v. California
(1963) 374 U.S. 23 [83 S.Ot. 1623, 10 L.Ed.2d 726], and
Malloy v. Hogan (1964) 378 U.S. 1 [84 S.Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed.2d
£53], compel us to accept it. The Mapp and Ker cases held
that a state must exclude evidence uncovered by an unreasonable search and that the standard of reasonableness is the
same under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Malloy
v. Hogan held that the standard for determining the availability of a claim of the privilege against self-incrimination
is the same under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
[8] . Federal rules based on the supervisory power of the
United States Supreme Court over the administration of
justice in the federal courts, however, are not binding on the
states. (Ker v. California (1963) 374 U.S. 23, 33 [83 S.Ct.
1623,10 L.Ed.2d 726].)
Defendants contend that GouZed v. Vntited States (1921)
255 U.S. 298 [41 S.Ot. 261, 65 L.Ed. 647], adopted the mere
evidence rule as a constitutional standard. Although the
court in Gouled purported to rest its holding on the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments, it did not rely on any specific constitutional language. There are compelling reasons, moreover,
for not blindly accepting that opinion at face value. Mapp v.
Ohio, supra, 367 U.S. 643, created problems that were totally
unforeseen in 1921, when the GouZed opinion was written.
The court that decided GouZed could not have known that
basing its decision on the Constitution, rather than on the
court's power to prescribe rules of evidence for the federal
courts, might one day have the consequence of imposing the
rule upon the states. Ker v. California has now recognized
that the purpose of the distinction between constitutional and
supervisory rules is to separate fundamental civil liberties,
which the states must respect, from federal procedural rules,
which the states may ignore. Opinions written before this distinction assumed its present crucial importance may have
to be reinterpreted in the light of "the demands of our federal
system." (Ker v. California, supra, 374 U.S. at p. 33.)
GouZed v. V.Ued States is a particularly apt candidate for
such reinterpretation, for its adoption of the mere evidence
rule as a constitutional standard was not necessary to the
result in the case. The validityl of a warrant authorizing the
seizure of materials stipulated to be merely evidentiary was
challenged. The federal statute under which the warrant was
issued authorized seizure only when the property was "stolen
or embezzled" or "used as the means of committing a felony. "
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(40 Stat. 228.) Instead of basing its decision on the statute
the court said that the search and seizure violated the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments. Perhaps it meant no more than that "
the seizure was unconstitutional because seizures that exceed
statutory authority are always unreasonable.
The Supreme Court itself has not treated the GouZed role
as a fundamental constitutional standard. Although the role
is now set forth in Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
rule 41(b}, the court has refused without explanation to apply
it to evidence other than tangible objects, such as that obtained by electronic devices designed to intercept ~onversatioDS,
although no policy reason for the distinction suggests itself. ,
(On Lee v. United States (1952) 343 U.S. 747, 753 [72 S.Ct.
967, 96 L.Ed. 1270).} No Supreme Court case since GouZed
has excluded evidence solely because of the Gouled role. The
rule has been distinguished nearly out of existence by the
instrumentality exception. The GouZed case recognized that
instruments used in the commission of crime may be seized
because of the public's interest in preventing their use in subsequent crimes. This policy, however, furnishes no justification
for the use of the instrument as evidence if such use would
otherwise violate the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. It is
not necessary to use the instrument as evidence to prevent
its use in future crimes. Sending the owner to prison may
prevent future crimes, but this consideration applies to mere
evidence as well as instrumentalities. The same might be said
of the other categories of evidence that may be seized, contraband and the fruits of crime. Certainly the sovereign or the
rightful owner may replevy such items, but why the admission
of evidence should turn on the law of replevin is a mystery.
(See State v. Bisaccia (1965) 45 N.J. 504 [213 A.2d l85].)
Nor is it clear by what means it can be determined whether
or not an object is the instrument or fruit of crime until the
owner's guilt or innocence is determined at the trial.
Thll first Supreme Court case to interpret the Gouled rule
was also the first case to use the instrumentality exception
to restrict its scope severely. In Marron v. United Statu
(1927) 275 U.S\ 192 [48 8.Ct. 74, 72 L.Ed. 23l}, federal
officers lawfully entered a saloon and observed illegal sales
of liquor. They then arrested the employees and patrons, and
seized a business ledger and some utility bills. The search
and seizure were held reasonable because they were incident
to an arrest, and the ledger and bills were admitted into evidence. The court met the assertion that the Gouled rule required their exclusion by holding that utility bills and business
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. accounts are convenient if not necessary for conducting an
. illegal liquor business and are therefore ileizable instrumentalities of the crime. No one claimed that seizure of the
ledger and bills would in any way prevent future crimes
except by enabling the government to obtain convictions.
It is contended that the Supreme Court retreated somewhat
from this position in United States v. Lefkowitz (1932) 285
U.S. 452 [52 S.Ct. 420,76 L.Ed 877,82 A.L.R. 775J.ln Lefkowitz, as in Marron, federal agents raided an illegal liquor
business and seized a number of items, including business
records and utility bills. The difference was that in Lefkowitz
the officers did not limit themselves to seizing items plainly
visible, but made a thorough search of the drawers, cabinets
and waste-baskets. The court suppressed the evidence because
the search was too broad. and because the items seized were
mere evidence. The manner in which Marron v. United States
was distinguished, however, hardly served to reinforce the
GouZed rule. In Marron, the court said, the search was
reasonable and the items were held to be instruments of the
crime. Since the items seized and the offense charged were
almost precisely the saine in both cases, the distinction between
the two cases was only the scope of the search. When the
search was so broad as to be exploratory in nature, the mere
evidence rule was resurrected as an alternative (and superfluous) ground for exclusion. When the search was otherwise
reasonable, the same items beeame instruments of crime.
.Marron and Lefkowitz set the pattern for future treatment
of the GouZed rule in the Supreme Court. Althougll the rule
was never expressly repudiated, evidence was never suppressed
because of it. In nearly every case the central issue was the
legality of a search incident to an arrest. (Davis v. United
States (1946) 328 U.S. 582,595 [66 S.Ct.1256, 90 L.Ed. 1453J ;
Zap v. United States (1946) 328 U.S. 624, 632-633 [66 S.Ct.
1277, 90L.Ed.1477]; Harrisv. United States (1946) 331 U.S.
145, 154 [67 S.Ct. 1098, 91 L.Ed. 1399J ; Abel v. United States
(1960) 362 U.S. 217, 234-238 [80 S.Ct.683, 4 L.Ed.2d 668J.)
A typical treatment of the rule is found in Zap v. United
States, BUpra, in which the disputed issue was whether incriminating evidence (a check) could be seized in the course of
a search to which the defendant had consented by contract.
The court held that since the search was lawful the agents
could have copied the check find used the copy as evidence;
therefore no purpose would be served by holding that consent
to the search was not also consent to the seizure. (328 U.S.
•

c.tcI-41
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at pp. 629-630.) The dissent raised the mere evidence rule,
but appeared to assume with the majority that the check could.
nonetheless be seized under a warrant. (Id. at pp. 623-633.):~
While Zap v. United States does not expressly abolish the'
rule, it saps it of all vitality. To say that the prosecution
could introduce copies of Dr. Thayer's records but not the
originals would be nonsense. "There is no war between the'
Constitution and common sense." (Mapp v. Ohio (1961) 867
U.S. 643, 657 {81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081, 84 A.L.R.2d
933].)
Thus the Gouled rule is often cited but no longer applied.,
Its claim to constitutional standing rests on a single case in ",
which it was not necessary to decide any constitutional issues. '1'
It ,has been distinguished to the point of extinction in subse- "•
quent opinions by the use of technical exceptions and without ""
discussion of policy. It is universally criticized by the writers, •
and lacks a clear basis in any constitutional language. Ker v.
Oalifornia, which was concerned with entirely different sub- • \
stantive issues, contains no indication that such a dubious '
technical rule will be imposed upon the states. [4] We hold I
that the mere evidence rule is not a constitutional standard !
and has no application in California. Other state courts that
have recently considered the matter have come to the same '
conclusion. (State v. Bisa,ccia (1965) 45 N.•J. 504 [213 A.2dl
185] ; People v. Oarroll (1964) 38 Mise.2d 630 [238 N.Y.S.2d A1
640].)
[5] Even if the mere evidence rule were a constitutional
standard, it would not require the exclusion of Dr. Thayer's'j~
medical care records, for they were the instruments of crime. ,~
The employees testified that they used the records to draw ~
up the fraudulent statements. In some cast's Dr. Thayer placed
wavy lines on the records to indicate tbat false billings werei
to be made. Under the circumstances, these records were more '~
instrumental in the commission of the crime than were the'
utility bills and ledger in Marron v. United States, supra,!
275 U.S. 192, and the code books in Abel v. United States, ,'~
S1lpra, 362 U.S. 217. {See also Matthews v. Oorrea (2d Cir. :~\i.,
1943) 135 F.2d 534; Landau v. United States Attorney (2d ,~
Cir. 1946) 82 F.2d 285, cert. den. 298 U.S. 665 [56 S.Ct.,,;tl
747,80 L.Ed. 1389].)
:A
[8] Finally, it should be noted that there are some opinions
that construe G01tled v. United States to protect privacy by""
preserving private pape11l, such as a personal diary, from any .:~
seizure. (Davis v. United States (1946) 328 U.S. 582, 595
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[66 S.Ct. 1256, 90 L.Ed. 1453] {Frankfurter, J., dissenting] ;

United States v. Boyette (4th Cir. 1962) 299 F.2d 92; United
States v. Stern (D.C.S.D.N.Y.1964) 225 F.Supp. 187.) This
construction is contrary to the opinion of the court in Gomed,
but even if there is such a rule, it would not prevent the
seizure of business files such as the medical records in this
case, which were freely open to the doctor's numerous employees. That business records are not constitutionally protected from properly authorized searches and seizures is indicated not only by Marron v. United States, supra, 275 U.S.
192, and Zap v. United States, supra, 328 U.S. 624, but also
by the doctrine that records that are required by law to be kept
are not protected by the privilege against self-incrimination.
(Shapiro v. United States (1948) 335 U.S. 1 [68 S.Ct. 1375,
92 L.Ed. 1787].)
The judgments are affirmed. The appeals from the nonappealable orders denying motions for a new trial are dismissed.
McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Peek, J., Mosk, J.,and
Burke, J., .concurred.
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied January
5,1966.
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